By Yochuku Ofoka Yobolisa, Editor in Chief
Before his appointment as Chief of the Army Staff, a notion of incompetence had enshrouded Lieutenant-General Ibrahim Attahiru so much that in December 2017 the Nigerian Army leadership at the time threw a blanket covering over him and summarily removed him, on grounds of inept command, as theatre commander of Operation Lafia Dole – the counterinsurgency arm of the service.
General Attahiru was relieved of his job in the northeast theatre for no other reason than his inability to meet a 40-day ultimatum to capture Abubakar Shekau – the notorious leader of Boko Haram – and bring terrorist incursions in the country to an end. To punish him, they sent him to army headquarters as deputy director of policy and plans. But what he did in four years at the policy and plans department probably staggered the imagination of not just his predecessor but also the commander in chief of the armed forces who saw the need to give him the widest area of responsibility, thus, entrusted him with commanding the entire Nigerian Army.
But has the general officer been able to prove his mettle in the last forty days or so of leading the entire army? What conclusive evidence could he point to in forty days to establish him as a dependable leader of the army high command?
His supervisors rated him. While his former boss described him as one who lacked the skills, qualities and ability to do something properly, the ministry of defence’s permanent secretary, Dr Musa Istifanus, thinks otherwise. The perm sec visited him and roundly classified him as one who is perfectly suited to fight Boko Haram and other armed insurrections tearing the nation. This may be a very high estimation coming from one of the most senior civil servants whose job is to evaluate individual and group performances in the ministry and advise the government accordingly.
Visiting the Chief of the Army Staff last week Dr Musa Istifanus called him as ‘a round peg in a round hole’ thus debunking the notions of incompetence and inept command held by the past army high command. Istifanus’ classification was a no-mean classification that must stem from the general’s mental and emotional character in the fight against Boko Haram and other insurgent movements.
General Attahiru has developed a new military vitality that has made the nation believe in the government’s counterinsurgency efforts – coercive diplomacy. He said the army under his command has made substantial progress in the fight against Boko Haram by dislodging the terrorists from their enclaves. How did he achieve that?
According to him, “Terrorist incursions in the northeast and other threats to national security will soon be over. In a very short time since I took over the mantle of leadership, the army has dominated the operations area, recaptured Marte and secured Dikwa from the terrorists. With adequate support, I will guarantee emplacing an army that will defeat all adversaries.”
The general is perhaps, not banking on military power and bloated budgets. He may be thinking of coercion against the terrorists, and skill and tact in dealing with his troops. Over the years, the government and military authorities have, to no avail, fought the terrorists without regard to cost in order to secure the nation from the masquerading terrorists. That is to say that there is no guarantee that bloated budgets and improved hardware and machinery will defeat the terrorists. According to experts, what will do it is the willingness and coercive diplomacy on the part of the military, political will on the part of the government and public support and encouragement on the part of the local population.
The president supported this position when he recently said that a well-armed military may not be enough to defeat the armed criminals, adding that the masses should come up with information and credible intelligence to aid the military.
Of course, no military plan of action, however carefully devised, ever succeeds if the troops’ and commanders’ morale is not adequately raised by their leader’s presence and tact. Then, what operational leadership strategies have Attahiru evolved so far to enhance the army’s operational efficiency?
A vox pop verdict assumes that ‘perhaps, he has mastered the secrets of commanding with firm control by giving orders and following them up closely. That accounted for the results he is getting after his address to the OLD troops at the army Super Camp 9 in Dikwa: He gave a-48-hour deadline to the troops to clear the enclaves held by insurgents in the northeast. And Marte and Dikwa were freed within that timescale. Dozens of other places held by the terrorists are being liberated. What we are witnessing, as a result, is the overt ability to coerce the troops rather than the ever-resonant emphasis on increasing military spending.’
The army boss may not have been tagged ‘a round peg in a round hole’ if does not show evidence that military power and fat budgets are not absolute necessities needed to dominate and influence the operations area. He has mastered the art of coercive diplomacy and willingness which have afforded the gains of dominating the operation areas which, in the last several years since the counterinsurgency operation earlier military leaders had failed to drawn on and use their vastly superior resources to end the Boko Haram insurgencies in the northeast theatre.
